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"Masterful
and definitive", "authoritative and devastating",
"extraordinary", "this dramatic book",
"superb ". These descriptions are all taken
from the cover of the paperback version of Ed Moloney's
No.1 best-seller. Moreover, The Blanket has
published a number of largely glowing reviews. Why
then did I find the book so disappointing, irritating
and ultimately boring?
Much
of the book is taken up with the peace process of
the 1980s and 1990s and the series of negotiations
that took place. Other books have documented these
events and this period just as well - Brendan O' Brien,
Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, Déaglán
de Breadún and Peter Taylor. What exactly does
Moloney's book add to these earlier accounts apart
from the apparent notion that Gerry Adam's ideas about
changing Republican strategy dated further back than
we were previously led to believe, that Charles Haughey
was more involved than previously met the eye, and
that the Brits had managed to get touts to senior
levels in the Republican movement? None of this seemed
to be of earth shattering importance or insight to
this reader, and certainly not surprising.
What
is new is Moloney's detailed descriptions of the two
IRA Conventions in 1996 and 1997. If he is to be believed,
and there seems little reason to question the accuracy,
Moloney clearly got hold of a very good source, presumably
someone opposed to the line that Adams and others
were pursuing. Interestingly, these sections of the
book have been given little prominence in reviews
of the book that I've read.
After
trudging my way through over 400 pages, the book suddenly
and inexplicably brings the whole story up to the
present, or at least 2001, when the IRA made its historic
statement about putting weapons "beyond use".
Huge chunks of political development are suddenly
jumped over. Yet, the late 1990s was a period of immense
change, both for the Republican movement and the Irish
political situation more generally, a lot of which
gets faint if any coverage, and is treated in a highly
and strangely truncated manner (do I suspect editorial
pressures from the publisher?).
During
this more recent period, but also in earlier years,
there are some amazing and glaring omissions. The
political effects of the Hunger Strikes are not given
prominence. No reference is made to the published
papers exchanged by Sinn Féin and the SDLP
before the Hume-Adams talks - a crucial development
from my recollection since it was the first time both
parties clearly outlined their positions and differentiated
themselves on a number of key constitutional issues.
Stunningly, no reference is made to the Brighton bomb!
The effect of the Canary Wharf bomb on the negotiating
stance of John Major is underplayed - surely a huge
success for the IRA in militaristic terms. No reference
is made to the formation of the Real IRA and Continuity
IRA, and the subsequent Omagh bomb. Finally and inexplicably,
given that it amounts to the success of the Adams
strategy, there is no discussion of Sinn Féin
out-polling the SDLP in the 2001 Westminster elections.
On
a stylistic level the book is badly written, lacking
fluency and coherence. As I think someone else has
said in one of the few criticisms that I have read
of the book, its structure is contrived, beginning
with the Eskund affair and then returning to it every
so often as if to prove something important, when
it doesn't. Also, the book jumps suddenly, confusingly
and with no obvious reason backwards and forwards
in time. Moreover, the author goes off on lengthy
tangents to explain, presumably for the popular US
and British audience, such issues as the historic
background to Irish republicanism, the IRA and the
British presence in Ireland more generally, and such
things as the specific situation in Derry (it's not
at all clear why that's included). For this reader
it led to major bouts of skip-reading given their
extensive coverage elsewhere and irrelevance to the
main subject matter.
Whatever
one can say about style and content, the book has
one fundamental weakness - the facile interpretation
of developments that Moloney puts on the political
and strategic changes that Adams took the Republican
movement through over the past decade and more. Like
so many others, Moloney sees the Good Friday Agreement
as the endgame, akin to Fukayama's "End of History";
the idea that somehow because of the acceptance of
a transitional way forward and the suspension of armed
struggle, it means that political struggle has now
finished and that Republicans have given up their
long-term aims. He states as early as the preface
that "the Troubles have ended" … "the
conclusion of the historic conflict between Ireland
and Britain". Really? This is just nonsense.
By presenting political developments within Irish
Republicanism in this way, never mind broader political
developments in Ireland, Moloney shows little understanding
of political struggle more generally and how political
tactics and means change and develop as circumstances
themselves change, both internal and external. Moloney
may have years of experience reporting on Ireland,
but that doesn't make him an insightful political
analyst.
Gerry
Adams and his closest allies have clearly had a long-term
view on how to proceed the Republican struggle for
many years, though probably not as well-defined as
Moloney would like us to believe. Given the length
of the peace process and the mind-numbing detail in
which it has been covered by the media, and followed
and pursued by Sinn Féin activists, is what
Moloney recounts the least bit surprising, never mind
insightful and new? Where have these glowing reviewers
been over the last decade and more? Have they really
been so blind to strategic changes that have been
going on in Republican circles for some time?
What
Moloney says is simply not new. The nature of the
events he recounts are central and normal to the evolution
of any national liberation struggle. Read Nelson Mandela's
autobiography where he tells of similar developments,
crises, contradictions of strategic means and personal
clashes in the ANC's history - for example, the use
of armed struggle, speaking to the apartheid government,
etc. Similar developments and debates are taking place
in the left nationalist movement in the Basque Country,
though with arguably less depth and, so far, with
less success. Palestine would be another example,
with the machinations going on between the range of
different political and armed groupings.
If
Moloney had produced a straightforward factual account
of political and strategic change within the Republican
movement, there would be far less of a problem. However,
it's his facile account of the strategic meaning of
political changes and developments that irritates,
together with his journalistic desire to find headlines
rather than meaningful and insightful interpretation.
Moloney
places himself in a contradictory position. He seems
highly cynical of Adams and the Republican movement
more generally, yet at the same time applauds Adams
for taking the road to 'peace'! For all of Moloney's
journalistic experience, such contradictions expose
his lack of political understanding, judgement and
strategic interpretation of political struggle. This
book is deeply flawed and simply not as good as many
would have us believe.
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