|
“Heavier-than-air
flying machines are impossible.”
British physicist and Royal Society President Lord
Kelvin (1895)
“The whole procedure [of putting rockets into
space] presents difficulties of so fundamental a nature
that we are forced to dismiss the notion as essentially
impracticable, in spite of the author’s insistent
appeal to put aside prejudice and to recollect the
supposed impossibility of heavier-than-air flight
before it was actually accomplished.”
British astronomer Sir Richard van der Riet Woolley,
reviewing, in Nature (14 March 1936), Phillip
E. Cleator’s Rockets Through Space (London:
1936)
“Space travel is utter bilge.”
Sir Richard van der Riet Woolley, U.K. Astronomer
Royal and
space advisor to the U.K. government (1956)
“Space
travel is bunk.”
Sir Harold Spencer Jones, U.K. Astronomer Royal (1957,
two weeks before Sputnik was launched)
“Ideas
for constitutional change must pass the test of intellectual
credibility and potential support: [Northern Ireland]
independence, unfortunately, can not pass either.”
Robin Wilson, head of Belfast think-tank “Democratic
Dialogue” (1997)
“What is wanted is not the will to believe,
but the will to find out, which is the exact opposite.”
Nobel Prize laureate Bertrand Russell, from his Skeptical
Essays (1928)
As recounted in “Academics
On Independence, Part I,” I wrote the following
in August 1999 to Prof. Brendan O’Leary:
Mr.[
Robin] Wilson, as I have learned firsthand, is so
dead-set against the notion of independence that
he-in direct contrast to you-won’t even engage
in an intellectually honest discussion thereon (as
documented particularly through his and my participation
in Dr. deBono’s 1997 Internet conference on
Northern Ireland, portions of which I have included
in earlier e-mail transmissions to you; those conference
submissions may yet be available in full on the
Internet), this notwithstanding the fact that he
heads a political think-tank calling itself, for
some reason, “Democratic Dialogue.”
Set
forth below are my postings from the “Constitutional
Change” portion of the “On-line Conference”
on Northern Ireland sponsored in September 1997 by
Dr. Edward de Bono (currently found at <http://www.edwdebono.co.uk/debono/ni2301.htm>;
<http://www.edwdebono.co.uk/debono/ni2302.htm>;
and <http://www.edwdebono.co.uk/debono/ni2303.htm>),
prefaced by Dr. de Bono’s invitation for discussion
on possible constitutional change. (NB: typographical
errors from the original postings have been corrected
herein, and emphases have been added to try to mitigate
the generally soporific effect of this piece’s
oppressive length.)
The
postings headed “4.31: (paul806) Tue, 16 Sep
1997 14:11:45 BST” and “4.53: (paul806)
Thu, 25 Sep 1997 15:12:22 BST” exemplify
my view that all too many academics in Ireland and
Britain have shamefully failed to take on - with any
modicum of intellectual honesty or intellectual courage
- the unorthodox issue of Northern Ireland’s
possible negotiated independence. (Cf. Nobel
Prize laureate George Bernard Shaw: “The reasonable
man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable
one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.
Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable
man.”)
****
N_I_2nd_Stage.4
Constitutional change
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.1: Edward de Bono (edwdebono) Tue,
09 Sep 1997 23:00:14 BST (4 lines)
Please post in this topic clear suggestions of possibilities
for constitutional change. Laying out options with
a particular emphasis on new options even if these
have never before been tried. Attention to why these
might, or might not, be acceptable.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.3:
Negotiated Independence (paul806) Wed, 10 Sep 1997
00:36:16 BST (36 lines)
Most respectfully and sincerely, I ask that all members
of this Conference use the rare opportunity of this
electronic forum to consider intently a very straightforward
approach for constitutional change, but one that few
of Ireland's leading citizens dare to discuss even
in whispers: fair and workable negotiated independence.
Please be aware that the possibility of independence
has at various times crossed the minds of various
intelligent and thoughtful people in Ireland, North
and South, sometimes as a goal affirmatively to be
pursued but more often merely as a "second choice"
constitutional option. These people have included
the DUP's Reverend Ian Paisley; the late Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Sean McBride (who, in the second half
of the 1970's, represented the IRA in joint talks
with the UDA on possible independence); the UDA's
late leader John McMichael; the UUP's Reverend Martin
Smyth; Belfast's Methodist College's late headmaster
Dr. Stanley Worrell; members of the SDLP leadership
in the mid-1970's; as well as others. According to
the DUP's Peter Robinson, the possibility of political
independence for Northern Ireland also at least crossed
the mind of David Trimble a decade ago ("UUP
leader under fire over document," Belfast Telegraph,
29 April 1997); that mid-1980's event, according to
Mr. Robinson, shows Mr. Trimble to be "wobbly"
on the issue of union. [In fact, Mr. Trimble formally
advocated Northern Ireland’s independence in
1988; while teaching at QUB, he wrote a paper on this
topic which included the following: “When we
come to agree on the inevitability of some form of
independence, we can shape our political offensive.”
(P.A.F., September 2002.)]
Unsurprisingly, it is very politically dangerous for
these people to take any genuinely affirmative stand
regarding possible negotiated independence; for this
reason, they generally do not - and probably will
never - do so. As a result, a middle ground approach
may never in fact be put to a vote of the people unless
some group outside of those "traditionalist"
politicians successfully prevails upon the British
and Irish governments to make that possible. Hence,
I feel this group's efforts could be particularly
valuable in helping to turn over this "stone"
that has thus far gone unturned.
(If Dr. de Bono would permit, I'd like to make available
to members of this group various materials, accessible
on the Internet, that I have written on the topic
of independence for Northern Ireland.)
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.8: Re Robin819's 4.6 comments (paul806)
Wed, 10 Sep 1997 23:24:24 BST (84 lines)
Robin 819: Having thanked you in 3.6 for your 3.4
comments, I hope you'll forgive me for now opining,
conversely, that you are thoroughly wrong in your
4.6 comments [which concluded: "Ideas for constitutional
change must pass the test of intellectual credibility
and potential support: independence, unfortunately,
can not pass either."].
In May of this year, I responded to then Foreign Minister
Dick Spring's comments - similar to your own [regarding
lack of popular support therefor] - as follows:
****
First, you suggest that "there is extremely
limited support in either community in the north"
for this approach. In that regard, however, I would
respectfully refer you to a 9 April 1997 Belfast
Telegraph article reporting on a Telegraph/Queen's
political survey. The results thereof showed
enormous differences between Protestants and Catholics
regarding their respective preferences for London
ties, Dublin ties, and "joint authority."
However, regarding the fourth examined possibility,
the cross-community results were stunningly similar:
as to a "Separate Northern Irish State,"
fifty percent of Protestants said they would at
least tolerate that result as part of a final settlement,
and forty-eight percent of Catholics reported the
same view. Particularly against this background,
it seems at least reasonably possible that spelling
out definitively three particular points might well
convince half or more of the "dissenting"
group to switch their positions in favor of fair
and workable negotiated independence: (i) independence
would not be a "halfway house" to a united
Ireland; (ii) independence would not entail any
reinstitution of the pre-1973 Stormont rule; and
(iii) independence could in fact be financially
viable, particularly with the help of long-term
subvention. Those points would manifestly best be
spelled out through the presentation of a plebiscite
"offer" in fact reflecting those several
characteristics.
****
Regarding
your 4.6 comments concerning the "3-4 billion
per year" now being pumped into Ulster, you seem
to assume that Britain is content to pay, perhaps
in perpetuity, such amounts to a province ever troubled
but that Britain wouldn't consider paying a similar
amount, for some period of time, to a neighbor establishing
itself in a new settlement. That assumption may indeed
be faulty.
More broadly, regarding the aim merely of looking
formally into possible negotiated independence, I
would reiterate something I wrote a couple of weeks
ago in reply to a letter from Ireland's Presbyterian
Moderator Rev. Dr. Samuel Hutchinson:
****
A proposal on negotiated independence would inevitably
be a "package" containing several elements;
conspicuously among them would be a "constitutional"
element and a "financial" element. Taken
at its broadest, my argument is simply to craft
the best possible constitution and to bolster it
with the best possible financial support that Northern
Ireland's neighbors and friends can muster (see
book at 171-72). If, at the end of the day, it appeared
that the financial support so offered would be inadequate,
then the Northern Ireland electorate might do well
to vote down that "package." At least,
though, at that point, Britain and others could
say, 'we tried our best,' and Ulster would be able
to say, 'the choice in declining the proposal was
our own.' (Unsurprisingly, this same basic approach
could underlie other key areas regarding an independence
proposal: try one's best and see, through a vote,
whether the effort was good enough.)
****
Confident
that you'll sympathize with my desire to get home
at a decent hour this evening, I ask that you forgive
me for quoting again from my letter to Mr. Spring:
****
I would respectfully urge, though, that - in light
of humanity's great capacity to solve complicated
problems - such potential difficulties should not
be anticipated so as to foreclose any attempt at
all[ regarding possible negotiated independence].
John Stuart Mill, in his On Liberty, wrote
something along these lines that I often quote:
"There is the greatest difference between presuming
an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity
for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and
assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting
its refutation." A failure in this regard could
only be counted as a noble one.
****
After
all these years of failure through "conventional"
approaches, let's not unilaterally declare possible
negotiated independence "dead on arrival"
... essentially, declaring that it cannot work in
order to foreclose any investigation that might prove
or disprove that assertion. Over the past three decades,
the "powers that be" have not been reluctant
to propose constitutional approaches that, even in
theory, are woefully inadequate. In theory, negotiated
independence might work. Why don't we try to see negotiated
independence taken down the road as far as it might
go and, if it gets as far as the point of a vote in
Northern Ireland, why not let the people have the
final say?
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.13: (paul806) Thu, 11 Sep 1997
14:57:56 BST (81 lines)
Robin819: Regarding your 4.10, I'd take exception
in one key respect: I think you are under no obligation
whatsoever to react positively to what I (or anyone
else in this group) writes. To the contrary, I think
this discussion is best served when you say precisely
what is on your mind, as you apparently did in your
4.6; by doing so, we get to the nub of issues that
are on a lot of people's minds. À la Voltaire,
I think your 4.6 comments were entirely wrong, but
I'd defend to the death your right to say them ...
and without any sort apology from you for having made
them. (In turn, I'd be grateful to hear any specific
counterpoints that you might have to my 4.8 comments
... or even to learn that I may have, in some respect,
convinced you on some of those points.)
Furthermore, and perhaps not to your surprise, I'd
also dissent from your other 4.10 comments. Your suggestions
are, at base, little different from what has been
going on in Northern Ireland since Stormont was prorogued
in 1972: trying to put some measure of new wine into
an old wineskin. I see two enormous problems with
that approach.
First, I sincerely doubt that "Northern Ireland
being highly autonomous as a region" will suffice
to end the paramilitary battle. This is part of what
I wrote in mid-July to Irish Times Northern Editor
Deaglan de Breadun:
****
Moreover, so long as Republicans find the prospect
of swearing allegiance to the British crown and
of formally accepting its sovereignty as unacceptable
preconditions to their taking full civic part in
their native society (a feeling that would seem
destined to continue for quite some time yet), that
movement will lack any ability to come to terms
with any solution involving continued union. Relatedly,
for as long as Republicans feel the current constitutional
situation to be unjust - i.e., go brach, perhaps
- their options will be either to leave or to fight;
staying to wage an entirely "constitutional"
battle is a prescription for a lifetime of political
failure, according to the demographics Mr. Blair
claims he sees three quarters of a century into
the future. Thus, any suggestions, hints, or implications
that Republicans might voluntarily accept any intra-UK
settlement can only be either (a) tactical diversions
("Sinn feints"), (b) wishful thinking
on the part of the observer, or (c) some combination
of both./2/
NOTE
2: This analysis [truncated within the context
of this posting] tends to establish that there
exist only five possibilities regarding fundamental
aspects of potential change in Northern Ireland's
political future: (i) one side might vanquish
the other (thirty years has demonstrated this
will never happen); (ii) one side might simply
surrender (similarly, this will not happen); (iii)
one side's "desire" may become impossible
(other than the unthinkable - that the Republic
would forswear any future reunion - this would
involve a demographic change wherein Ulster voted
50.01% or more for reunion: London ties would,
at that moment, become forever impossible); (iv)
Northerners might very broadly accept genuine
condominium of Ulster (this event would not occur
due, inter alia, to substantial Unionist opposition
thereto); or (v) Northerners might implement a
fair and workable negotiated independence (UDI
is, for various reasons, impossible). The only
alternative to such change is the maintenance
of the status quo: i.e., the Troubles.
****
The
second main problem (perhaps better categorized as
a deficiency to your suggestion) that I see is that,
even if your approach might stabilize the political
situation, it would most likely do little or nothing
to end or reduce the prevalent "us versus them"
aspect of Northern Ireland's society.
Conversely, if each side in Northern Ireland publicly
(and, of course, simultaneously) gave up their most
cherished "union" and "reunion"
desires/goals, each side could see the other as making
a huge contribution to a political society to which
each could give full and genuine allegiance. At that
point, various other aspects of Ulster life could
begin a perhaps slow but steady improvement.
In sum, before seeking merely a minor variation on
what has already failed over years and decades, why
not try an untried approach? Again, as I recounted
in 4.3, various leading Ulster thinkers have gravitated
towards independence (for varying reasons); nonetheless,
that approach has never been taken up seriously because
of, inter alia, the "logistical" problems
you suggested in your 4.6 comments. Let us see whether
those "logistical" problems can be overcome
(without the input of local Northern Ireland leaders);
if they can be, we'll then be able to see what those
leaders' positions on independence in fact are when
they are presented with what I have termed a "ready-to-wear"
proposal for fair and workable independence.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.15: (paul806) Thu, 11 Sep 1997
18:08:21 BST (53 lines)
Endeavoring to keep this somewhat shorter, I would
suggest that possible negotiated independence would
not ask "unionists and nationalists to renounce
their respective allegiances/identities." (From
[Robin819's 4.14, which began, "Paul806: I'm
loath to get into a long dualogue [sic; “duologue”]
(as against dialogue)."].)
To the contrary, and as I have elsewhere argued, dual
citizenship, for any so desiring it, would be fully
compatible with an independence scheme; in a very
large and real sense, dual citizenship would permit
a continuation of allegiances and identities held
dear without those allegiances and identities serving
as exclusionary devices within a "middle ground"
society. In that setting, people could have an honest-to-God
"parity of esteem," as in, "She's also
a citizen of the Republic (or a British subject),
which is her own business and her own choice, but
she and I share an allegiance to our local government."
(The term "parity of esteem" is, I think,
largely bandied about these days as though it is something
that can be handed out like so many lumps of coal.
That use of the phrase often arises in contexts similar
to Mr. Blair's May 1997 Balmoral speech: there'll
be union for as far as the human eye can see; there'll
be additional ties with Dublin only as the Ulster
majority sees fit; but, we'll give Nationalists "parity
of esteem.")
Agreeing wholeheartedly (from 4.14) that others in
this Conference should get into this discussion, I
would reiterate that the past three decades have not
demonstrated that constitutional half-measures can
effect any real improvement nor have those decades
proven that fair and workable independence cannot
work. Along these lines, Sir Something-or-Other (I
don't remember his name; he was Ms. Thatcher's advisor
on Ulster who then went on to be High Commissioner
of India) wrote to me in early 1987, after receiving
from a third-party the proposal on investigating negotiated
independence. His response was, essentially, 'tut,
tut ... let's just see how the November '85 Anglo-Irish
Agreement does.' That Agreement was a dozen years
ago; the situation in Northern Ireland remains such
that concerted international efforts (not excluding
this Conference) are being made to address serious
and continuing problems in Ulster.
My main points here are two. First, I do not want
negotiated independence for Northern Ireland ... what
I fervently want is for the people there to have a
chance to vote on the best plan for independence that
human hands can fashion; what they might do with that
opportunity would be entirely for themselves to decide.
Second, a proposal for negotiated independence would
have the huge benefit of certainty: within a year's
time, such a plan could be crafted and voted upon,
whereupon it would be accepted or rejected. Thus,
at the end of that time, all would know whether a
middle ground had been reached (perhaps somewhat,
or largely, grudgingly) or whether the approach of
negotiated independence had been demonstrated to be
inadequate.
The alternative of attempting some small "tweak"
to the 1973/1985/1993 Anglo-Irish attempts brings
speedily to mind the recent colloquial phrase, "Been
there, done that."
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.19: Importance of "Oath"
(paul806) Sat, 13 Sep 1997 16:52:03 BST (21 lines)
James897 (re your at 4.17): I agree that the recent
vote in Scotland is of interest vis-à-vis Northern
Ireland; but, as Northern Ireland itself had, for
fifty years, a parliament roughly equivalent to what
Scotland is getting now, and as that Ulster parliament
did not resolve - but rather helped foster - the current
"Troubles," I wouldn't go so far as to say
the Scottish vote "puts a completely different
perspective on NI."
However, your observation regarding the fundamental
importance, to the current situation, of the Oath
of Allegiance is extremely well taken. Nonetheless,
it could be that even going so far as to oust the
Crown entirely, even if done tomorrow, might be inadequate
"remediation" vis-à-vis the current
conflict. Moreover, certainly more likely in the real
world is that Britain will spend the next one, two,
or three generations figuring out what role, if any,
the Crown should have in Britain's social/political
life; in the meantime, the "Oath" problem
you rightly identified will persist.
For this reason as well, I yet think that, before
still another generation goes by in Ulster, formal
examination of possible independence should be made.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.21: (paul806) Sat, 13 Sep 1997
20:10:07 BST (48 lines)
Frank884: Thanks for the question[ on economic considerations],
which manifestly is key.
Buried, I'm afraid, in my overly long 4.8, was the
following:
**********
Regarding
your 4.6 comments concerning the "3-4 billion
per year" now being pumped into Ulster, you
seem to assume that Britain is content to pay, perhaps
in perpetuity, such amounts to a province ever troubled
but that Britain wouldn't consider paying a similar
amount, for some period of time, to a neighbor establishing
itself in a new settlement. That assumption may
indeed be faulty.
More broadly, regarding the aim merely of looking
formally into possible negotiated independence,
I would reiterate something I wrote a couple of
weeks ago in reply to a letter from Ireland's Presbyterian
Moderator Rev. Dr. Samuel Hutchinson:
****
A
proposal on negotiated independence would inevitably
be a "package" containing several elements;
conspicuously among them would be a "constitutional"
element and a "financial" element. Taken
at its broadest, my argument is simply to craft
the best possible constitution and to bolster
it with the best possible financial support that
Northern Ireland's neighbors and friends can muster
(see book at 171-72). If, at the end of the day,
it appeared that the financial support so offered
would be inadequate, then the Northern Ireland
electorate might do well to vote down that "package."
At least, though, at that point, Britain and others
could say, 'we tried our best,' and Ulster would
be able to say, 'the choice in declining the proposal
was our own.' (Unsurprisingly, this same basic
approach could underlie other key areas regarding
an independence proposal: try one's best and see,
through a vote, whether the effort was good enough.)
****
**********
Additionally,
Frank, I would add that this financial consideration
constitutes, in another respect, a main reason why
Ulster politicians cannot institute any formal investigation
of possible negotiated independence: not only would
they have to run the risk of huge "backbench"
disapproval of their risky efforts, but they'd also
have to come cap-in-hand to London (and, perhaps,
elsewhere) looking for financing to make it possible.
If, though, another group were to make this call,
it could say: "London, negotiated independence
might be possible if a good enough constitutional
and financial package were put together. Give it a
try!"
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.25: Democratic basics (paul806)
Mon, 15 Sep 1997 13:55:33 BST (31 lines)
There's been quite a bit of recent discussion regarding
what "consent" does mean, should mean, or
might mean in the current Ulster context of possible
constitutional change. In a recent letter to a British
official, I wrote:
****
Rather than basing my position on the answer to
a question that may be essentially unanswerable
- i.e., whether, from some moralistic standpoint,
Ulster's majority or Ireland's as a whole should
prevail regarding Northern Ireland's constitutional
status - I have sought to urge people to consider
a second question whose affirmative answer would
obviate the need to resolve the first. That second
question is: might there exist a some political
structure that could receive the support of both
a majority in the Republic and a supermajority in
Northern Ireland?
****
Along
those lines - and putting entirely aside any consideration
(or speculation) about feasibility - I have suggested
that people from all sides might agree to the following:
*************************************************
In light of fundamental principles of democracy,
we the undersigned must conclude as follows: were
a proposal for Northern Ireland's independence to
receive approval from the British Government, the
Irish Government, the people of the Republic through
a plebiscite, and at least two-out-of-three voters
in a Northern Ireland plebiscite, such approval
would constitute a legitimate democratic mandate.
*************************************************
I
would be most interested and grateful to hear from
members of this Conference either "I would agree"
or "I would disagree" and, if the latter,
any reasons why.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.28: Re Frank884's 4.27 (paul806)
Mon, 15 Sep 1997 17:58:02 BST (16 lines)
Thanks, Frank for responding directly[ and affirmatively
to my 4.25 posting].
You are literally correct about my having "le[ft]
out the population of Wales, Scotland, and England."
I had long thought that support at Westminster per
se would adequately represent those electorates, though
I have no particular objection to plebiscites in those
regions as well. On 21 December 1980, the Sunday Times
commissioned an opinion poll similar to the one you
suggest (as Ian Paisley had done, seventeen years
ago). The results "showed that, in a Paisley-styled
referendum, 50% of Britons would vote against union,
29% for, and 21 % would abstain or didn't know what
they would do." "Diary of Events,"
Fortnight, no. 150, March/April 1981, pp. 9, 10.
My guess is that, seventeen years later, a vote in
Great Britain would be considerably more lop-sided
in favor of Ulster's independence.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.29: (paul806) Mon, 15 Sep 1997
18:03:18 BST (52 lines)
Robin819: I was sorry that, in your 4.26, you didn't
respond to my 4.25 comments, which attempted to address
- and even to establish - at least one fundamental
point regarding a "democratic dialogue"
in this situation.
(Several years back, I posed a question via fax to
all the "traditionalist" political leaders
in Ulster that is very similar to my 4.25 inquiry,
namely: "If a plan for negotiated independence
were approved by the British government, the Irish
government, the people of the Republic (through a
plebiscite), and more than two out of three of those
voting in a Northern Ireland plebiscite, would you
personally accept that decision of the voters?"
Only one politician replied, promptly and directly:
Dr. Alderdice, saying that, while he was personally
against such an approach, he would nonetheless answer
"yes." Within days thereafter, at a January
1994 New York meeting (prominently featuring the then-recently-visa'd
Mr. Adams), I posed the same question to Mr. Hume
in the course of a quite public question and answer
session (as I had stated, in my aforementioned fax
to him, that I would attempt to do). Not entirely
surprisingly, he ducked and dodged the question, never
answering it directly.)
Please permit me to address your 4.26 comments in
light of my 4.25 reflections: a Republican or Nationalist
might indeed respond to your suggestions by saying,
'I don't want variable geometry nor weighted majorities
nor similar devices; what I want is the British governmental
presence to be out of Ireland because the majority
of the people in Ireland want that result and, thus,
that is the democratic result.' Naturally, a Loyalist
or Unionist might indeed counter that assertion by
saying, 'The majority in Northern Ireland is the group
which, democratically, should decide Northern Ireland's
constitutional future.' Both sides, I feel, would
have a substantial case to make regarding whose version
of democracy should control; hence, my attempt to
circulate an alternative which might, at least in
principle, satisfy both.
Please bear in mind two key points. First, my 4.25
inquiry does not ask whether one might want independence
for Northern Ireland, nor whether one thinks independence
might be feasible, nor whether one thinks it might
ultimately be supported adequately at the polls. Second,
and still further, it does not ask whether one would
agree that absolutely any proposed constitution imaginable
which received the level of support described ought
to be regarded as democratically valid.
Instead, it asks merely: if an independence proposal
received that described level of support, could that
decision be regarded as anything other than a democratic
decision? If yes, precisely how and in what way might
that decision be regarded as "undemocratic"?
I yet hope that the participants to this Conference
will address these fundamental questions (thanks again
to Frank884 for having already done so).
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.31: (paul806) Tue, 16 Sep 1997
14:11:45 BST (43 lines)
Robin819: While some of your 4.30 is a bit obscure
- e.g., "extremely long positionalising of a
fundamentalist character is not dialogue" - several
points in our recent postings are hugely clear: (i)
I posed a very plain question to the whole group in
my 4.25; (ii) you ignored it in your 4.26; (iii) I
responded to your 4.26 comments in my 4.29 and expressed
my regret that you hadn't answered my 4.25; (iv) you
responded in 4.30 but manifestly did not answer my
4.25 question. This record speaks for itself and does
so quite plainly.
In your 4.30, you said, "I am sorry to be so
frank," whereas I would prefer that you were
much more "frank," as in Frank884, who in
his 4.27 directly answered the question you've twice
tried to avoid answering.
You assert, "it is impossible to have a real
dialogue about an unreality." (4.30.) Please
permit me to respond by suggesting that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to have real dialogue where one
party poses a question and the other party refuses
to answer it plainly, honestly, and directly.
Being a "voice ... in the wilderness," as
you suggest of me (4.30), isn't the worst thing in
the world, I say from some considerable experience.
Worse, I feel, would be to do nothing while observing
police officers being shot in the back of their heads
on patrols, young women being shot in the face as
they sleep, old men being tortured and killed, people
looking for a cool drink in a pub winding up fatally
on the receiving end of a mob's boots, etc.
At base, what I hope for is rather modest: for an
untried "middle ground" approach, already
espoused by intelligent partisans on both sides, to
be formally examined in order to see - for the record
- whether it might succeed or fail.
The fact that we are having any "dialogue"
at all unarguably stems from the fact that a dozen
or so approaches over the past quarter of a century
- each, at least in some senses, less "radical"
than the one I propose here - have all proven manifestly
inadequate. You, though, (a) decline to answer a question
I pose on fundamental democratic principles and, instead,
(b) argue merely for what I would term yet more constitutional
"baby steps" (presumably a position you've
recently come to and not one that you have been "[r]ehearsing
... for a long time"). Would you forgive me if
I expressed a very strong disinclination to defer
unconditionally to your position?
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.32: (paul806) Tue, 16 Sep 1997
22:00:54 BST (59 lines)
In response to the comment that "most people[
in this Conference] are still operating on a reductionism
mindset" (posting:1.96), "reductionism"
is defined in my dictionary as "a procedure or
theory that reduces complex data or phenomena to simple
terms," but that definition goes on to add, "esp.:
OVERSIMPLIFICATION."
The 1.96 comments, and the overall Ulster situation,
remind me, somewhat, of the history of the development
of television.
Some people may be unaware that, before "electronic
television" (i.e., television using a cathode
ray tube to display its picture), there existed a
device known as "mechanical television."
Using a system of overlapping metal disks - each having
a certain pattern of slits, which would spin in opposing
directions at precise rates via gears and electric
motors - light would be shown through so as to project
a variable pattern onto a translucent screen. This
system would indeed allow pictures to be sent across
distances, but its "costs" were very heavy:
especially in view of the rather poor quality of images
rendered, the mechanics of the system were intricate,
costly, and cumbersome, and people in front of the
camera had to endure bizarre makeup (as I recall,
purple face paint, orange lipstick, and the like)
and blazingly hot stage lights. One inventor spent
decades of his life trying to improve and perfect
this "mechanical" system ... until he first
saw an early and crude version of the "electronic"
system. No one, including that inventor, spent time
with mechanical television thereafter.
My point is this: many people seem to think that the
Northern Ireland political situation needs only a
couple (or several or many) small "tweaks"
in just the right places to get that lovely region
properly on track (sort of like the "mechanical"
television inventor trying to find out whether purple
face paint would render better images than would green
face paint, etc.). The past quarter century, I think,
has shown this "tweaking" approach to be
extremely unpromising: there have been many constitutional
tweaks (or attempted tweaks) over this period but
no substantial advancements (remember, there's been
direct rule for all but a few months of the past twenty-five
years). It seems at least arguable (I personally would
say, it seems virtually unarguable) that some new
system needs at least to be considered ... that mere
"tweaks" will not get the current Northern
Ireland political system working adequately.
Under this analysis, certainly no one would be obliged
- nor asked - to state, "we were wrong to tweak
and we must never tweak again." But such people
might simply decide to take a brief time-out from
tweaking and say, "before we tweak further, let's
try a markedly different approach, even if only to
see it fail (or, alternatively, if only to prove that
it will fail)." After such a failure, these people
could go back to "tweaking," and they could
do so to their hearts' content and in the firm knowledge
that they have not unwisely permitted to go unexamined
a promising (perhaps merely a slightly promising)
alternative.
In this regard, please bear again in mind my favorite
quotation of John Stuart Mill (from his On Liberty):
"There is the greatest difference between presuming
an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity
for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming
its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation."
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.34: (paul806) Wed, 17 Sep 1997
18:08:28 BST (23 lines)
Will959: Thank you for the thoughtful question in
your 4.33[ on a new "label" for the people
of Northern Ireland].
Did you see my suggestion somewhat along these lines
in 4.15?
*****
[D]ual citizenship, for any so desiring it, would
be fully compatible with an independence scheme;
in a very large and real sense, dual citizenship
would permit a continuation of allegiances and identities
held dear without those allegiances and identities
serving as exclusionary devices within a "middle
ground" society. In that setting, people could
have an honest-to-God "parity of esteem,"
as in, "She's also a citizen of the Republic
(or a British subject), which is her own business
and her own choice, but she and I share an allegiance
to our local government."
*****
I
think there would arise a "joint identity"
- through a joint, chosen citizenship - where each
side had decided to take a giant step to a fair and
workable middle ground; actual solidarity between
the communities could develop from that point, regardless
of whether those people thereafter called themselves
Ulstermen, North Irish, both, or something else.
Without a genuine political settlement, though, I
fear that just a new label describing the two groups
wouldn't make much difference.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.36: (paul806) Fri, 19 Sep 1997
01:27:59 BST (40 lines)
Steph852 re your 4.35: You pose some damned good
questions ["Is a united Ireland or civil rights
the more important to the Nationalist community? Is
being in the UK or living in peace the more important
to the Unionist community? If civil rights and peace
are not the definite answers to the two previous questions
for the clear majority of N. Ireland then would independence
not be difficult to sell?"]; I wouldn't even
pretend to tell you that I know for sure how a vote
on a proposed independence plan would turn out ...
whether it would be 8% in favor or 80% in favor.
One of my basic thoughts in this regard is as follows
(from a letter earlier this year; cutting and pasting
saves me some writing time):
*****
[P]erhaps the largest political mystery of Northern
Ireland is why folks there (and elsewhere in Ireland)
might even dare to hope that there could in fact
be any resolution of the conflict absent some genuine
change in one or more of the following points: Unionists/Loyalists
want ties (a) with London but (b) not with Dublin,
whereas Northern Nationalists/Republicans want ties
(i) with Dublin but (ii) not with London.
*****
Continued
union (absent joint authority) would mean that Unionists/Loyalists
would "win" by a score of 2 to 0. Conversely,
reunion would involve a 2 to 0 "win" for
Nationalists/Republicans.
Joint authority (a 1 to 1 tie), which would likely
present yet another version of constitutional disaster,
is manifestly unwanted by Unionist politicians; it
therefore seems very unlikely joint authority could
form the basis of a "Talks" settlement.
Negotiated independence (the other possible 1 to 1
tie) - if proposed directly the Northern Ireland voters
- could present those people with the first genuinely
difficult electoral question they've ever had to face.
Each might conclude, 'it is less than I want, but
I'd not be forced to give allegiance to a government
I don't feel genuine allegiance to.' If a good enough
constitution were fashioned (certainly with equal
rights features, probably with "dual citizenship"
opportunities), and if adequate interim and long-term
financial support were there, perhaps the package
would turn out broadly to be adequate ... perhaps
it would not. No one would be able to say authoritatively
what the answer to that question would be without
putting together a package, letting the people examine
and consider it reflectively, and asking the people
to mark their ballots. Virtually beyond dispute, though,
is that such a poll would take on directly and honestly
(and perhaps even equitably) four of the largest of
the root causes of the current conflict.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.38: (paul806) Fri, 19 Sep 1997
14:14:16 BST (17 lines)
Seam920 re your 4.37[ which began, "A small comment
on the contribution 4.31 by Paul806, being rather
trenchantly critical of Robin819."]: I hope you'll
reexamine my various contributions to this conference
(not least of which, the first paragraph of my 4.13)
to see that, consistently, I have hugely desired open
and dignified discussion and exchange of ideas.
When, though, I have put forward a point, and another
party cavalierly dismisses it - not through genuine
argument but through a mere wave of the hand and a
curt "that's impossible" - I naturally feel
compelled to point out the paucity of considered thought.
I genuinely hope and expect that what I post in this
conference will come under the close scrutiny of the
participants; it would be rather odd if I felt differently
about what other people post.
On substantive points I have raised, I would be most
grateful to hear specific comments from you on where
you think I have erred ... or, perhaps, regarding
where you feel I have somehow stumbled onto some minor
truth.
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.43: (paul806) Sun, 21 Sep 1997
15:16:37 BST (58 lines)
Steph852: Thanks for your 4.39[ "Paul806 makes
sense when he suggests that the electorate may compromise
when it comes to a vote on independence, certainly
they are more likely to do so than many of the political
leaders. This could be another way to keep momentum
in the talks."]. I appreciate your tending to
concur with the opinion that the Northern Ireland
electorate might be able to compromise on a "middle
ground" approach that their respective leaders
cannot compromise on themselves.
How possibly to bring about that opportunity for the
voters in Ulster is what you further discuss in your
4.39. Your comments brought to mind an analogy that's
been on my mind for some time.
Let's say you have a car you want to sell, and you
believe with all your heart that it's worth 1000 pounds,
but you've advertised all over and no one has offered
that amount. A first prospective buyer says to you:
"If I can borrow 100 pounds from each of two
cousins, get a 100 pounds advance from my boss, scavenge
100 pounds worth of old metals from an abandoned factory
site, and combine those amounts with the 100 pounds
I already have, will you sell me the car for 500 pounds?"
It wouldn't be at all surprising if you said the polite
equivalent of "shove off" (such as, "Come
back and see me when you've got a 1000 pounds in your
pocket."): life is short, this person hasn't
offered you any substantial evidence that he can get
together even 500 pounds, and that 500 pounds would
only be half of what you wanted in the first place.
(You might well further conclude that, if you give
this guy any sort of encouragement, he'll come back
next time and say, "I could only get together
300 pounds, but you suggested last time you'd take
500 pounds, and 300 isn't really that much less than
500, so will you sell for 300?")
If, though, a second prospective buyer comes by, takes
out his wallet, counts out 500 pounds in cash, and
says, "Do we have a deal?," you would be
faced with a very different question: that amount,
too, is only half of what you want, but it's the best
offer you've yet seen, and this deal - unlike the
first one - can be fully consummated immediately.
I'm not telling you that I know exactly what you'd
wind up doing, but you'd be faced with one hellova
lot tougher decision. You might ultimately decide
that that bird in the hand was worth more than the
two in the bush you've been hoping for.
My points are these: (i) if a "first buyer"
type of offer regarding possible independence is ever
presented formally to the Northern Ireland voters,
as through some "preferendum," we should
expect to hear a rather resounding "no"
response (this Conference itself has demonstrated
that some people seem to believe - resolutely though
entirely incorrectly - that even putting together
an honest-to-God "ready-to-wear" plan for
fair and workable independence is impossible) but
(ii) no one knows - or can know - for certain how
those same voters would in fact react to a "ready-to-
wear" plan that would give them, politically,
only about half of what they would like in a perfect
world (which, rather plainly, we don't live in).
The British government, particularly with Labour's
large majority, has the power to see if a "ready-to-wear"
plan can indeed be fashioned. If a group such as this
Conference encouraged Blair to do so, we all might
see directly answered an interesting question whose
answer we cannot know today: would fair and workable
independence be good enough to settle the matter?
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.46: (paul806) Tue, 23 Sep 1997
23:36:25 BST (38 lines)
Steph852,
Regarding your 4.45 ["The best way to convince
people in this conference that a 'ready to wear' independence[
is possible] is for you to provide one."], I
couldn't possibly agree with you more ... which is
why I spent a year in Belfast writing a book with
precisely that goal in mind; the book was published
in the middle of 1993. After six overview chapters
on the history of Ireland and Northern Ireland, the
book included the following as its "Part II:
A Chance for Peace in Northern Ireland": Chapter
Seven: "Non-Solutions"; Chapter Eight: "Independence:
A Constitutional Framework"; Chapter Nine: "Towards
Implementation"; Chapter Ten: "Could a Proposal
for Independence Succeed?"; Conclusion; and Postscript
Conclusion.
In light of your suggestion, you might be interested
to review the following, an early and a concluding
portion from Chapter Eight:
*******
[I]t should be abundantly clear that nothing here
is written in stone - everything [discussed in this
Chapter] would be subject to additional study, discussion,
and modification. The main contention of this chapter
is that this constitutional proposal, taken as a
whole, could meet the political needs of Northern
Ireland today.
****
The aim of this chapter was to present a prima facie
case for the feasibility of constructing a workable
constitution for an independent Northern Ireland.
... It would be, at best, fatuous to assert that
implementation of this or any other constitutional
proposal could solve all the many and varied problems
of Northern Ireland. The argument here is, instead,
that the adoption of a constitution following this,
or an equivalent, framework would establish a political
structure within which the general situation in
Northern Ireland could finally begin to improve.
*******
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.49: (paul806) Wed, 24 Sep 1997
17:48:46 BST (68 lines)
Jam978: Your 4.47 comments voiced feelings that
are likely widely shared ["Independence is 2nd
best solution for most Unionists and is a non-starter
for Nationalists. Stormont was bad enough but there's
no way u'd let them run the place on their own. ...
Solve what is possible not what is impossible."].
Please allow me to address a couple of them.
I think it is hugely important that any independence
plan receive very broad support. For that reason,
it has been my view that no such plan should be implemented
unless it can get the approval of the Irish government,
the people of the Republic (through a constitutional
referendum), and at least two out of three voting
in a Northern Ireland plebiscite.
Maybe getting that level of support - even for the
most fair and most perfect independence proposal that
humankind could ever imagine - would, at the end of
the day, prove to be impossible. But, particularly
where Northern Nationalists - whom the last election
demonstrated to be roughly 40% Northern Ireland's
voters - would themselves be able to "veto"
such a plan, what would be the harm (especially after
seeing three decades of failure in other efforts)
in actually trying to see whether such a plan for
independence might be possible and acceptable? (Along
these lines, I'd greatly appreciate hearing your specific
comments on my posting:4.25 and the second-to-last
paragraph of my posting:4.13.)
You correctly say that independence is a second-best
solution for Unionists, but I'd respectfully disagree
with the notion that it is a "non-starter"
for Nationalists. Over the course of several years
in the second half of the 1970's, Sean McBride was
himself serving for a representative of the IRA in
obviously informal talks with the UDA on possible
independence. At about the same time, there were backbench
calls (which were unsuccessful) within the SDLP in
favor of examining possible independence; as I understand,
at least one high-ranking person ultimately left the
SDLP over that issue. Of course, I'm not trying to
tell you that, today, Nationalists are widely and
constantly screaming for this approach to be investigated,
but these Nationalists and some others have indeed
been interested in looking into it further.
You wrote that there's no way you'd let Unionists
"run the place on their own." What if a
government could be set up so that Unionists would
clearly not "run the place on their own"?
What if it could be constructed so that - entirely
different from the pre-1973 Stormont - Nationalists
would have genuine and real participation in that
government? (Please note that I'm not talking about
setting up bogus "watchdog committees" in
some new parliament; I'm proposing that Nationalists
have honest-to-God power and direct impact in such
a government ... and I'm suggesting, too, that that
government could work well.)
Here's perhaps my greatest concern regarding what
you've written. I think a "ready-to-wear"
plan for independence could be constructed and that
it could ultimately receive the support of voters
in the Republic and more than two out of three voters
in the North, whereas you think that independence
is simply "a non-starter for Nationalists."
If I am wrong about my position, and if a proposal
aspiring to that end is formally developed and put
to a vote, it will simply fail; the situation at that
point wouldn't be a lot worse, if at all, from what
it is now. If, though, you're wrong about your position,
and if independence is disregarded merely because
people tend to believe and assume it to be impossible,
then people will have walked away from a middle-ground
approach without ever giving it a fair look or an
appropriate chance.
Your position can be proven completely correct by
trying what I suggest and seeing it fail somewhere
along the way ... but that's the only way you can
prove your position to be correct. Otherwise, one
person's guessing that independence wouldn't work
may not hold any more water than someone else's guessing
that it might work. Especially given the stakes, why
not find out for sure instead of just guessing?
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.53: (paul806) Thu, 25 Sep 1997
15:12:22 BST (41 lines)
In posting:4.51, Robin819 agrees with posting:4.47:
"Jam978 is right to criticise paul806's monologue
on independence (to which old Northern Ireland hands
have already been relentlessly exposed)[.]"
Robin819 fails to note, however, that, in posting:4.50,
Jam978 kindly begins his reply message (to my posting:4.49)
by saying: "Paul, I have no problem with your
proposals being put to a referendum."
What I find very difficult to understand is this:
if a person is so confident that a fair and workable
plan for independence could not succeed, why should
he be so reluctant to be proven correct? Why not let
Britain work up such a plan, put it to the appropriate
plebiscites, and see it fail? (The answer can't be
simply a "waste of time" argument; look
at all the time that's been wasted already in woefully
inadequate political approaches over the past generation.)
Such a person would then be in a position to trumpet:
"Though I may not have found a way forward myself,
I have definitively demonstrated that Paul806 was
wrong!!" Rightly or wrongly, I personally would
find no great shame in that result; I tend to think
- particularly in matters of great import - that it
is better to try and fail than never to try at all.
Whatever relentlessness I may have in this regard
stems largely from the fact that these most recent
"Troubles" may hit their fourth decade and
may even go beyond that point: they haven't been solved
yet. Perhaps they will prove entirely beyond the wit
of man to solve. Perhaps they will be solved by a
seventeenth or twenty-ninth or forty-third round of
constitutional tweaking.
But perhaps they might be resolved another way that
some people seem resolutely determined to assume -
with an unsubstantiated veneer of authoritativeness
- cannot succeed. As I wrote in a letter earlier this
year:
******
In the end, it seems difficult to disagree seriously
with the Easter message (Belfast Telegraph, 31 March
1997) of Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Robin
Eames: "We all long for a breakthrough in relationships
which will remove the obstacles to a community at
peace with itself." Along these lines, "[t]he
Archbishop said Northern Ireland needs more men
and women of vision who can ask the question: 'Why
not?'"
******
N_I_2nd_Stage.4.56: (paul806) Thu, 25 Sep 1997
23:58:13 BST (10 lines)
Steph852 re your 4.54: Thanks for the encouraging
comments and suggestions and, all the more, for your
open-mindedness[: "I think everyone should give
Paul806's idea a chance"].
What I think might be best would be if I were able
to work up a text file for one or more of the parts
of my earlier writing (especially, Chapter Eight on
"Independence: A Constitutional Framework")
and see if there might be a way to make it accessible
through this Conference.
The administrators are very prompt in their responses,
so perhaps we can figure out a way to do this in the
next few days.
All
postings should be regarded as (c) The Creative Team
and (c) The Author, unless otherwise stated.
Index: Current Articles + Latest News and Views + Book Reviews +
Letters + Archives
|
